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Abstract 
The present tort compensation scheme which has been widely adopted in common law jurisdictions to address 
the financial needs of injured victims has been found to be riddled with deficiencies. In focusing on negligence 
and causation as the foundation of liability, the adversarial system of the law has been strongly criticized as, 
failing to provide fitting and timely compensation, requiring injured claimants to go through difficult, stressful 
and long, drawn out litigation procedures coupled with significant legal fees and administrative costs. Concern 
over tort’s effectiveness as an appropriate  personal injury compensation mechanism for victims of motor 
vehicle accidents and the realization that the traditional tort system developed in the days of the horse and 
carriage was never contemplated to address contemporary issues facing accident victims, a number of common 
law jurisdictions have initiated significant departures from the system and have moved in the direction of 
adopting an alternative no-fault compensatory model where all persons injured in road accidents obtain 
compensation regardless of establishing fault thus shifting the focus on the needs of the injured victim rather 
than on one’s culpability. These modern compensation schemes are premised on the philosophy of community 
responsibility, social justice and public benefit. This paper surveys the failings of current system of civil liability 
in the tort of negligence for motor vehicle accidents and undertakes a comparative analysis to evaluate the 
arguments in support of the introduction of such a scheme in Malaysia, its viability and challenges.     
Keywords: No-fault compensation, Motor accident, Negligence 
 
1. Introduction 
The introduction of no-fault liability compensation schemes to cover industrial accidents in the nineteenth 
century has set the impetus for other aspects of the civil justice system to conduct studies on the viability of 
alternative compensation models for their respective scope of activity. The use of motor vehicles as an 
indispensable mode of modern day conveyance has had its impact on a corresponding surge in the number of 
road accidents. The common law tort mechanism was adopted in most common law jurisdiction to determine 
liability and assess damages to be awarded to the victims of such accidents. However, the practical experiences 
learnt from its operation over the years have seen the system being fraught with weaknesses producing financial 
hardships, emotional stress and grave injustices to the injured victims. Recognising its inappropriateness as a 
compensatory model for victims of motor vehicle accidents, mature common law jurisdictions like New Zealand, 
Australia and Canada have been prompted to initiate moves to abandon the traditional tort mechanism and in its 
place, design and implement an alternative remedial compensatory model. The outcome has resulted in a shift of 
resources away from a system founded on the notion of fault in the direction of introducing an alternative 
statutory based no-fault system which was viewed as a fairer compensation regime that will provide 
comprehensive level of benefits expeditiously and at reasonable costs to all injured victims regardless of fault.  
These modern compensation schemes have been premised on the philosophy of community responsibility, social 
justice and public benefit. This paper surveys the failings of current system of civil liability in the tort of 
negligence for motor vehicle accidents and undertakes a comparative analysis to evaluate the arguments in 
support of the introduction of such a scheme in Malaysia to address the growing concerns of injured victims. 
With social progress and change in societal values, individual and moral responsibility premised on the notion of 
fault was replaced with a contemporary system based on collective or community care and responsibility for the 
members of its society. Individual rights and freedom of choice was compromised for the greater good of the 
community. The paper concludes by looking at a scheme which guarantees comprehensive no-fault benefits to all 
injured persons while at the same time allowing qualified access to common law damages for those 
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non-negligent victims.  
 
2. The Common Law Tort System: A Critique  
It was fifty years ago that the Committee of Absolute Liability, New Zealand had in its Report concluded that 
there was a case for an accident insurance scheme that would cover all persons who are injured in any way 
notwithstanding negligence on their part. The Committee found that the traditional ‘rules of negligence 
developed in the days of the horse and buggy’ was never designed to address current situations faced with 
congested roads and high speed modern traffic. A decade later in 1974, the Royal Commission of Inquiry, 
Compensation for Personal Injury in its Report had outlined four principal criticisms against the system. They 
were: that the philosophy upon which the common law depends is illogical; the outcome of litigation is entirely 
uncertain and affected by mere chance; the procedure is lengthy and slow moving; and the absence of 
rehabilitation in its awards (Woodhouse Report, 1974). Some of its manifested weaknesses are discussed below.  
 
2.1 The Fallacy of ‘Fault’ 
Proving fault on the part of the defendant tortfeasor has been the cornerstone of liability under the modern tort 
action of negligence. This served to restrict the scope of the defendant’s liability rather than expanded it 
(Robinson, 1987). Although it formed the foundation of the claimant’s right to sue the wrongdoer for damages, 
the success of the action depended largely on the claimant’s ability to establish negligence on the part of the 
defendant and that the alleged negligence had caused the injuries and loss complained of..The burden is carried 
throughout the entire length of the trial subjecting the claimant to satisfy both the legal and evidential burden of 
proof. To achieve this result, the claimant has to first clear the hurdles placed by the strict rules of evidence and 
procedural requirements of proof that the defendant has committed a fault before being entitled to recover any 
compensation. Should he fail to discharge this burden, then the defendant has nothing to answer. It is immaterial 
whether he has proved his defence or not. The plaintiff must prove his. Fault liability therefore shifts the focus of 
the court’s attention away from the claimant’s injuries to the nature of the defendant’s conduct. It looks not to the 
needs of the accident victim but rather to the ‘fault’ of the defendant (Jones, 2002). If fault is not proved, then no 
matter how innocent the claimant and how serious his injuries the common law would leave him to bear the 
whole burden of his losses, notwithstanding its sizeable extent. 
Road traffic accidents occur suddenly and unexpectedly. The judgement of drivers often involves split-second 
observations and decisions. This makes it difficult for the court in ascertaining who was at fault in the eyes of the 
law. Witnesses would have not been paying close attention at the time of the accident and their reliability is 
further undermined because the question of fault often has to be determined many years after the accident on the 
basis of the imperfect and uncertain recollection of events. They are not trained nor have the experience to gauge 
speed, time or distance, evidence which may be crucial in determining liability. Assessments of fault finally 
made on the basis of unreliable and incomplete information would produce distorted outcomes.  The tort system 
has been known to place too much emphasis on the driver’s blameworthy conduct without appreciating the fact 
that human error may not be the sole and independent cause of the accident. A combination of factors may have 
resulted in an accident. High traffic density, slippery road surface, road construction, roadside structures, weather 
conditions, poor lighting, mechanical defects, obstruction of vision and inadequate and improperly erected road 
signage have been identified as some of the causal factors. The Committee in the Woodhouse Report has stressed 
that accidents are not due so much to human error but to the present ‘complicated and uneasy environment’.  
Fault-based analysis that was introduced “in the days of the horse and buggy” was never designed to address the 
common cause of personal injury by accident and “personal attribution of fault has little relevance to 
contemporary life” (Puteri Nemie, 2004). Further concerns have been put forward by Atiyah who has listed six 
arguments against the notion of the fault principle. They are (i) that the compensation payable bears no relation 
to the degree of fault; (ii) that the compensation payable bears no relation to the means of the defendant; (iii) that 
the fault principle is not a moral principle because a defendant may benegligent without being morally culpable 
and vice versa; (iv) that the fault principle pays insufficient attention to the conduct or needs of the plaintiff; (v) 
that justice may require payment of compensation without fault; and (vi) that fault is an unsatisfactory criterion 
for liability because of the difficulties caused in adjudicating on it (Atiyah, 1980). Besides, not all injured 
victims of motor vehicle accidents may choose to institute an action for damages against the offending driver. 
For example, passengers in motor vehicles driven by a family member, friend, colleague or relative who are 
victims of negligence of the driver do not usually pursue their claim. They are among those persons who endure 
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pain and sufferings but receive no compensation (Ambiga, 2007).  Included in this list are the so called 
“hit-and- run” accident victims who are unable to file an action for damages as the identity of the wrongdoer or 
his vehicle cannot be established. Such issue of identifying precisely the driver who was responsible is not 
required under a no-fault compensation scheme where compensation is based on injury and not on fault 
(Menyawi, 2002). 
 
2.2 Administrative Inefficiency  
There must be administrative efficiency in the proper utilization of resources when operating a selected 
compensation scheme. Its achievement must not be eroded to the extent that its benefits are delayed, or are 
inconsistently assessed, or the system itself is administered by methods that are economically wasteful (Todd, 
2000). The present tort system has been found to be far too costly to operate and in many ways most unfair 
(Owen, 1985). The high costs involved in the administration of the compensation system, including legal fees 
and other charges, absorb a substantial portion of what is finally paid over to successful claimants. The Pearson 
Report estimated that the costs and expenses of operating the tort system amounted to about 85 percent of the 
value of tort compensation payments, or about 45 per cent of the combined total of compensation and operating 
costs (Pearson Report, 1978). This compares unfavourably to national social security system which has 
administrative expenses amounting to 11 percent of disbursements (Swanson, 1990). The Woodhouse Report 
found that “as a system it is cumbersome and inefficient; and it is extravagant in operation to the point of 
absorbing for administration and other charges as much as $40 for every $60 paid over to successful claimant”. 
Studies have found that given the circumstances of motor vehicle accidents, tort litigation is considerably more 
expensive than tort litigation in other forms. Slightly more than half of all liability insurance premiums are 
diverted to solicitors’ fees and administrative costs (Gary, 2000). More recent evidence in the UK suggests that 
legal costs, including both claimant and defendant costs, averaged about 30 percent of the total motor personal 
injury payments (Lewis, Moris and Oliphant, 2006). The position in Malaysia is no better than other common 
law jurisdictions and the issue of high cost of litigation has been the subject of considerable concern to various 
bodies especially consumer movements (Consumer Association of Penang, 2011).  
 
2.3 Delayed Justice 
The hallmark of a just and efficient legal system is its ability to offer prompt and timely delivery of justice to an 
injured claimant. A common and yet painful cry of the victims of motor vehicle accidents is the extensive delays 
involved before they finally obtain any compensation and until such time, they receive nothing from the 
defendant tortfeasor. Waiting for a period of four to five years or even more from the date of the accident is quite 
common in Malaysia and by the time compensation is received, it is often too little too late. Victims of serious 
bodily injuries are often in dire need of immediate financial assistance to pay for medical treatment, recuperation 
and rehabilitation in order to lead a normal life again and return to gainful employment. The protracted delays 
cause the injured litigant and his or her family to suffer unnecessary anxiety, financial hardship and mental 
distress while having to shoulder the whole financial burden of the loss (Todd, 2000). The difficulties are further 
compounded by the uncertainty whether or not they would finally actually receive any compensation for their 
injuries and losses.  
A combination of factors has been identified in contributing to the delays as part of the legal process involved in 
tort litigation. They include: obtaining the relevant police reports, police sketch plan with key and police 
photographs of the scene of the accident depicting the position of the vehicles after the accident and the damage 
caused to the vehicles; difficulties in the location of witnesses and collection of evidence; getting medical 
reports; the need to arrange for examination and obtain reports by specialist medical practitioners; arranging 
suitable trial dates that are convenient for all parties involved; the congestion of court lists with increasing 
volumes of cases being filed; to patiently wait for the victim’s injuries to stabilise and obtain a further medical 
report that would genuinely reflect the seriousness of the injuries with any resulting permanent disabilities so 
that appropriate damages can be assessed; and the frequent postponement of cases. 
 
2.4 The Uncertainties of Litigation Outcomes 
Under the tort liability system, the innocent victim of a motor vehicle accident needs to pursue his claim in court 
against the alleged wrongdoer for compensation for his injuries and losses. His right to sue does not however 
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guarantee the result he seeks. He has the difficult task of proving the defendant’s negligence and the resulting 
damage he had suffered and the causal link between the two, fulfilling both the legal and evidential burdens of 
proof. The outcome of the civil litigation has been described as being always a matter for conjecture (Franklin, 
1967). The plaintiff must always make an election whether to pursue the wrongdoer at the risk of receiving 
nothing or to abandon his claim for damages altogether or settle the claim for a much lesser amount. There are 
uncertainties affecting the prospective plaintiff such as the uncertainty concerning the court’s ruling on liability 
which would  determine whether the claimed damages are payable or not; the impact of the court’s ruling in 
regard to the payment of costs of the action and since, “costs follow the event” the parties are faced with the 
risks not only on the outcome of the court’s ruling, but also on the costs incurred; and the uncertainty whether an 
offer of settlement will be made by the defendant’s insurers, so that an early settlement can be agreed thus 
avoiding a trial and the payment of costs. A combination of all these factors creates an environment of risks and 
uncertainty for the injured plaintiff leaving them ‘under pressure to settle their claims for amounts less than they 
would receive if their claims went successfully to trial’ (Rogers, 2010). 
  
2.5 The Lump Sum Award  
The only form of compensation known to the common law is a lump sum award. The defendant pays the 
damages to the plaintiff all at once, usually some time shortly after the settlement or judgement, whether the 
amount is paid in a lump sum or periodically did not matter because it is the amount paid that impact the goals of 
tort law (Henry, 2002). The plaintiff, on the other hand, must commence his action reasonably promptly “once 
and for all” for his entire loss, both past and future. He can neither split his cause of action by suing separately 
for different heads of damages nor can he bring a subsequent action to increase the award in case the loss turns 
out to be less than expected at the time of the trial. Compensation has been accepted as a major aim of an award 
of damages for personal injury. Its object is to place the claimant in the position he had been in financially, had 
he or she not been injured. This has been a practice in common law countries to award damages for personal 
injury and loss of dependency in one lump sum in a single action. But there are those losses that have no obvious 
money equivalent or which cannot be valued with the same degree of accuracy such as pain and suffering and 
loss of amenities of life. 
Lump sums are arrived at by adding together the approximate money values for each category of loss suffered by 
the injured claimant. They include compensation for both losses already suffered and those which are expected 
in the future. Pre-trial losses, including loss of earnings can quite readily be expressed in monetary terms and 
agreed. However, in cases of serious injury, damages for pain and suffering and loss of amenities, and future 
losses, such as the loss of future earnings and the cost of continuing medical and nursing care, are likely to be the 
largest component in the lump sum award. In such cases, losses are difficult to assess accurately. There is always 
an element of uncertainty about what would have happened had the accident not taken place and what will 
happen in the future (Lunny and Oliphant, 2010). The lump-sum principle, combined with the rule that damages 
can be recovered once only, causes serious difficulties in actions for personal injuries, particularly where the 
medical prognosis is uncertain. The victim’s condition may worsen or, it may unexpectedly improve. The court’s 
assessment of damages based on assumptions may hence prove to be incorrect (Jones, 2002). 
Thus, the practice of paying damages in one lump sum has been heavily criticized and a major disapproval of 
such an award is the difficulty, if not impossibility, of accurately estimating future economic loss (Palmer, 1993). 
Inaccuracies that occur can never be adjusted in favour of the plaintiff because the assessments are made with 
absolute finality (Woodhouse Report, 1974). Damages awarded for the future are based on an injury the effects 
of which will continue to impact on the life of the road accident victim. Medical practitioners who provide 
reports on the medical condition of the victim may have examined the victim only once or twice and then based 
on the prognosis predict the duration of impairment or disablement and the degree to which such disablement 
may be reduced by surgery or by the provision of aids or devices. They may make predictions on the victim’s 
ability to recover and return to employment or his ability to remain employed in a particular job. Where the life 
expectancy of the victim of a serious injury cannot be predicted with any certainty, a lump sum award made on 
the basis of such predictions may either be an overestimation or an underestimation if they are inaccurate. 
The system provides no opportunity for constantly monitoring and reviewing the victim’s condition against the 
lump sum award. This can prove unsatisfactory as it offers the plaintiff no recourse if his condition worsens after 
the trial or if something unforeseen at the time of trial occurs which drastically alters his position. Any 
improvement or deterioration in the condition of the victim is completely irrelevant where lump sum awards are 
made as a ‘once-and-for-all’ payment. There is no room for adjustments if it appears that the forecasts are 
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inaccurate (Margaret, 2009). The uncertainties resulting from such predictions may result with the victim either 
having not received enough or receiving too much for his or her anticipated future loss of earnings. Sometimes 
the claimants survive far beyond their anticipated lifespan and find that the damages awarded have been depleted 
and they are forced to spend their remaining years depending on family members for charity or on the state for 
any welfare or disability payments. Should the claimant die sooner than was anticipated in the court judgement, 
the balance of the damages awarded might become a windfall to his or her beneficiaries as it may happen in the 
case of a child who dies just a few weeks after the compensation award for pain and suffering, loss of amenities, 
nursing care until she reaches the age of, say for example, 55 years, was paid to her mother. 
Furthermore, there is no requirement that the lump sum damages awarded to the victim to provide for his future 
medical, rehabilitation or nursing care expenses would be utilized for such support. The court is unconcerned 
with what the successful plaintiff will eventually do with his awarded sum. It does not look beyond the 
judgement to ensure that the sum is actually spent for the purposes it is awarded. Extravagant spending by the 
claimant will tend to exhaust the damages quickly. Monies meant for nursing care and for the loss of future 
earnings may be expended to provide for the needs of immediate and close family members of the victim, 
housing requirements, educational needs etc. and in years to come, the claimants may find themselves without 
the necessary financial resources to provide for medical, rehabilitative or nursing care or basic daily needs for 
future years because the funds expended for purposes other than for which they were intended are now depleted. 
This frustrates the very purpose for which damages were awarded to the injured claimant and experiences reveal 
that lump sum judicial awards made in favour of victims of serious injuries are fraught with concerns and are 
under attack (Steven, 1985). 
 
2.6 Deterrence a Misguided Element   
Tort law was promoted as a system where wrongdoers pay for the injuries they cause, thus encouraging socially 
desirable conduct. The prospect of having to pay compensation for losses suffered in cases of personal injuries 
and death will act as an incentive for negligent road users to exercise care to avoid causing accidents. To restore 
the victim to his original position and repair the damage caused, the defendant wrongdoer must be required to 
make good the loss that he had caused the victim by his wrongful conduct and by threatening the people with 
having to pay for the harms that they have caused, tort law forces them to take the interests of others into account 
and thus succeed in preventing injuries by deterring dangerous and harmful conduct (Calbresi, 1965).  
It is in these circumstances that tort liability provides an important financial incentive in preventing those 
injuries which can be avoided by tortfeasors taking reasonable precautionary action. By and large, a motorist 
who drives at a dangerously high speed not only dangers third parties but simultaneously endangers himself and 
is therefore contributorily negligent for the injuries he suffers as a result of his own negligent conduct. His 
recovery of damages is proportionately reduced. Besides, it also has its objective of fairness or corrective justice 
in requiring the defendant to bear the burden of assuring that the plaintiff receives compensation for the injuries 
caused as a result of his negligent conduct, thus righting the wrongs and doing justice between the parties 
(Schwartz, 2000). Additionally, tort law has been viewed as a mechanism for punishing wrongdoers (Cook, 
1996). It is seen as a retributive mechanism (Martin, 1990). On the other hand, there is the opposing argument 
that the deterrent element will be non-existent if the negligent and potentially harmful conduct in question had 
not caused injury or loss to anyone thus resulting in no legal liability. There has to be a victim who claims to 
have suffered harm as a consequence of that wrongful conduct for tortious liability to arise before the deterrent 
argument can come into play. 
Driving can be potentially dangerous no matter how careful a motorist is as it only takes a split second for a 
disaster to strike and accidents are typically the result of a momentary lapse in attention. Sometimes a period of 
momentary inattention can produce tragic results, while in others a case of extremely bad driving can fortunately 
result in the driver escaping any accident. Imposing liability would not produce the desired effect on inadvertent 
negligent conduct that result from momentary lapses of attention since people who act inadvertently are not 
acting in ways that presuppose the use of their conscious, rational minds. Motorists cannot be compelled by 
sanctions or induced by pecuniary incentives to have continuous attention in the course of driving. They are 
exposed to a plethora of risks while driving and many competing demands for their attention and can therefore 
devote close attention to some risks only at the expense of inattention to the other risks, the lapse of which may 
have resulted in an accident (Howard, 1985). There are two further reasons that have been advanced to explain 
the ineffectiveness of the deterrent function under tort liability. First, the penal sanctions contained both in the 
Road Transport Act 1987 and in the Penal Code. Motorists’ behavior is covered in a comprehensive manner by 
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the nation’s road traffic laws. Almost every instance of a motorist’s negligence violates some legal provision and 
hence exposes the negligent motorist to public law penalties and in no other sector of tort law is there such an 
extensive system of public regulation paralleling the tort system (Schwartz, 2000). Second, the statutory 
requirement for all motor vehicles on the road to be covered with compulsory third party insurance policy in 
respect of third party risks. 
It is more likely that the threat of these punitive sanctions for such negligent or reckless conduct and for driving 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor and drugs present in the Road Transport Act and Penal Code would 
instill fear and compel the potential defendant wrongdoer to exercise reasonable care, obey the road traffic rules 
and avoid potentially dangerous conduct. In their absence, tort liability operating independently is unlikely to 
deter such misconduct on the road. To the motorists, considerations of personal safety, fear of licence suspension 
and the threat of criminal sanctions is enough to deter dangerous conduct (Robinson, 1987). The deterrence 
function will eventually have to be shifted from judgements for compensatory damages awarded by the courts to 
penalties imposed by regulatory agencies (Brown, 1985) and in avoiding accidents the incentives provided by 
regulatory instruments such as criminal law sanctions combined with regular supervision are more effective in 
the domain of individual torts (Hubbard, 2006). The question whether replacing tort liability by a no-fault 
scheme would remove the deterrent function on accident-producing activities was considered by the Law 
Commission which came to the conclusion that the alleged deterrent role of tort was not significant citing a study 
of traffic accidents in New Zealand which showed that its removal had no adverse effect on driving habits 
(Brown, 1986). It has also been argued that there is no clear evidence to show an unequivocal link between the 
impact of imposing tort liability for causing injury with lower accident rates (Todd, 2011). 
 
2.7 Compulsory Third Party Insurance                 
The deterrent element has been further weakened by the introduction of compulsory third party liability 
insurance. In Malaysia, the legislature had intervened in the tort mechanism through the enactment of Section 
90(1) of the Road Transport Act 1987 requiring motor vehicle users to have in force a policy of insurance in 
respect of liability connected with the death or bodily injuries to third parties arising out of the use of the motor 
vehicle on a road. An injured person has now been given a statutory right to bring a recovery action against the 
insurer of the negligent motorist for damages although not being a party to the contract of insurance entered into 
between the insurer and the insured. A judgement which has been awarded in his favour may thus be enforced 
directly against the insurer. The compensation is therefore not paid by the defendant tortfeasor and “the claim 
that the prospect of damages has a financial implication loses all its force against a background of compulsory 
insurance by means of which these losses are so widely shared”. Complete liability insurance protection that 
shifts the direct economic deterrent pressure of tort law from would be tortfeasors to insurance companies, 
‘undoubtedly blunts the deterrent edge’ (Rogers, 2010). This shift complicates tort law’s potential for 
behavioural control (Stephen, 1985). The wrongdoer is left unpunished in a system of tort liability where 
punishment has been a significant justification of the system (Menyawi, 2002). 
On the other hand, writers such as Calabresi are of the view that this role of punishment should be left to the 
sphere of criminal law and not be extended into civil accident claims. He believes that to deter acts that are 
sufficiently bad regardless of their market usefulness is not through a "fault" system connected with insurance 
devices but through criminal or semi-criminal penalties (Calabresi. 1985). It has been said that there simply does 
not exist any clear and unambiguous evidence that the tort system has significant deterrent effect, whether 
directly or within its modern law and economics garb (Palmer, 1995). Accident-producing behavior carries a 
substantial risk of injury to the driver himself and dangerous conduct commonly constitutes a criminal offense 
and if a motorist is not discouraged by the threat of injury to himself and the threat of penal sanctions, he is 
unlikely to be deterred by the possibility of tort liability, particularly if an insurer will absorb the worst 
consequences (Brown, 1985). Another unfair aspect of the third party liability insurance is its exclusiveness, 
restricting coverage only to a limited class of injured persons and under specified circumstances. The scheme 
excludes coverage to the insured driver and his permitted driver, motor cyclists and their pillion riders, family 
members, friends and passengers travelling in his vehicle, and those self-employed persons travelling under a 
contract for employment. 
 
3. The New Zealand and Victorian Experiences  
It was through the Accident Compensation Act 1972, which came into force on April 1 1974, that the New 
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Zealand Parliament decided to replace the common law action for damages for personal injury based upon proof 
of another’s fault with an accident compensation scheme where the right to recover compensation was based on 
the claimant being covered by the scheme. A person, who suffers personal injury by accident or dies as a result 
of personal injury so suffered, is barred from bringing any action for damages arising out of the injury or death in 
any court in New Zealand independently of the Act. It was a pure ‘no-fault’ compensation system. The Scheme is 
administered by a corporate body known as the Accident Compensation Corporation which is largely 
independent of government control. Among its primary duties, the Corporation determines cover for persons for 
whom claims are lodged; provide entitlements in accordance with the provisions of the Act; manage the assets, 
liabilities and risks in relation to the Accounts required to be maintained and operated; collect levies; and 
administer dispute resolution, reviews and appeals. The Motor Vehicle Account derives its funds from premiums 
paid by motor vehicle owners and holders of trade plate licences in conjunction with the registration and annual 
licensing of that vehicle or the issue of licences. A petrol levy at the rate of 9.9 cents per every litre is paid 
annually by the Government to the Corporation. There will also be appropriations made by Parliament to the 
Account. 
The 2011-2012 levy rates to be applied by the Corporation for motorists for the annual vehicle licensing fee and 
petrol levy was $334.52 per motor vehicle. The Account recorded an increase in levy revenue of 16.4% rising 
from $846 million in 2010 to $985 million in 2011.  It has net assets of $4.5 billion and outstanding claims 
liability of $7 billion. However, a pragmatic view of the Motor Vehicle Account actually demonstrates a net 
surplus of $1.14 billion for the year 2010/2011 compared to $530,409 for the preceding year (Annual Report, 
2011). The total net levy revenue collected by the Corporation was about $4.8 billion compared with $4.5 billion 
that was recorded for the previous year. The surplus from underwriting activities and investment income were 
$1.8 billion and $1.7 billion respectively compared with $1.1 billion and $1.4 billion received from the same 
sources respectively for the previous year.  The total costs of claims incurred were $2.9 billion compared to 
$3.8 billion for previous year. The Corporation enjoyed an overall net surplus of $3.5 billion compared with $2.5 
billion for the previous year. Its funding targets were exceeded for all accounts during 2010 – 2011 and as a 
result of its strong performance the Accident Compensation Corporation had expressed confidence that it would 
reach its full funding requirements as targeted by the year 2019.   
The surpluses generated by the scheme, minimal administration costs involved, the provision of automatic and 
extensive coverage of benefits at affordable charges, prompt and expeditious delivery of certain and well 
informed benefits and entitlements have all contributed to the success of the Scheme. The Scheme has been 
recognized as an exemplary model for a universal no-fault liability scheme for victims of all accidents and has 
been judged to be a substantial success (Todd, 2002). It is the most extensive no-fault compensation scheme to 
have been implemented in the common law jurisdiction and the most radical departure from private law and has 
been also described in a brochure published in 2004 to mark 30 years of the Accident Compensation Corporation 
as “the most rational and the most humane compensation law in the world” (ACC Report, 2004). Victims of 
accidental injury need not prove fault or causation. As long as injury is satisfactorily established, the claimant 
will receive compensation from the scheme for his losses. There is no danger of the scheme leaving a victim 
entirely uncompensated and there is no danger of a single defendant being forced to bear the full costs of the 
injuries (Miller, 2006).  Throughout the 1980s and till today, there has been no call to return to the former 
common law system of compensating accident victims (Rennie, 2003). Todd in his evaluation of the 
performance of the statutory scheme in New Zealand, commented, “… Others, including me, view the scheme as 
a substantial success. The cost compares very well with any system where liability needs to be proved, the 
coverage is far greater and the benefits are affordable. Any public administration is not necessarily inefficient” 
(Todd, 2002). Todd judged the scheme to be a success in comparison to the tort system and according to him it 
was unthinkable that after 25 years of experience New Zealand will return to a tort system (Todd, 2011). 
The Australian state of Victoria introduced a modified “no-fault” scheme through the Transport Accident Act 1986 
the purpose of which was to establish a scheme of compensation in respect of persons who are injured or die as a 
result of a transport accident.  It is a comprehensive no-fault liability accident compensation scheme in which 
anyone who is injured or dies as a result of a transport accident within Victoria or interstate if in a 
Victorian-registered vehicle is eligible to receive compensation, irrespective of who caused the accident. A key 
feature of its scheme is the combination of no-fault and common law benefits where everyone was covered 
regardless of fault, as well as allowing those who could prove fault to pursue further a common law claim for 
damages through the courts for pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life and past and future loss of earnings. 
But their right to sue and recover damages from a negligent driver has been significantly restricted by allowing a 
claimant to sue for pain and suffering and economic loss only if he or she has suffered “serious injury”.  
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Besides, the claimant must prove negligence against the other party and commence proceedings within six years 
from the date of injury. Ceilings are set on the maximum amount recoverable under common law. Damages 
payable for pain and suffering is limited to a maximum sum of $487,100 and the maximum sum payable for 
pecuniary loss (past and future loss of earnings) is $1,096,020. The threshold for common law access is $48,690 
(Transport Accident Act 1986). The figures are indexed in accordance with the Consumer Price Index of 
Melbourne at the beginning of each financial year. In addition, the Commission will apply a 6% discount to the 
lump sum award for damages made for future economic loss to allow for inflation, income from the investment 
of the sum awarded and the effect of taxation on that income. The Transport Accident Commission established 
under the Act is also the monopoly compulsory third party insurer of all Victorian registered motor vehicles and 
as such, the Commission pays damages to accident victims who have sustained serious injury and thus had 
access to common law remedies. An analysis of the financial performance of the Commission discloses an 
after-tax operating loss of $1,024 million in 2011/12 compared with an after-tax operating profit of $279 million 
for the previous period. This was the result of significant volatility and uncertainty in the global financial 
markets which contributed to the massive drop in investment income from $748,717 in 2011 to $332,401 in 2012, 
the major factor attributable to the loss (TAC Annual Report, 2012).  However, the Commission’s performance 
from insurance operations had increased to $351 million compared to $187 million for 2011. This strong result 
reflects the Commission’s emphasis on efficiencies, accident prevention and strong claims management.  
Moving in the direction of a scheme that is based on community care, support and responsibility, rather than one 
that is founded on fault, the Australian Government has very recently introduced a new National Injury Insurance 
Scheme that would provide lifetime care and support services to all people affected by catastrophic injury arising 
from motor vehicle accidents. States and territories are required to set up no-fault catastrophic injury schemes by 
the end of 2013.The scheme would provide reasonable and necessary attendant care services; medical and 
hospital treatment and rehabilitation services; home and vehicle modifications; aids and appliances; educational 
support; help for people to have a greater role in the workforce and socially; and domestic assistance. The 
additional funds required for the scheme would come from existing insurance premium income sources and from 
local rates (Productivity Commission Report, 2011).    
 
4. The Case for a No-fault Compensation Scheme in Malaysia  
A functional structure made up of holons is called holarchy. The holons, in coordination with the local The need 
for an alternative scheme for motor vehicle accidents in Malaysia has been proposed for a few years since 1980’s 
(Harun Hashim, 1995). The proposal is not only founded on the argument that the existing law is inadequate to 
provide compensations to accident victims but it is also supported by strong practical considerations and cogent 
policy reasons (Lee, 2005). A no-fault approach is recommended to address the injustices perpetuated by the 
existing system and to make certain that claimants receive prompt and expeditious relief with minimum 
formalities regardless of who caused the injuries without the need of having to go to court. The scheme will 
remove the financial hardship and emotional distress of families of accident victims during the period of 
incapacity with the provision of guaranteed benefits that would preserve their quality of life and human dignity 
and make them useful citizens of the nation. Furthermore, experiences can be drawn from the SOCSO scheme 
established under the Employees’ Social Security Act 1969. The no-fault scheme for industrial injuries and 
occupational diseases has been in operation for 41 years. SOCSO’s surplus of income over expenditure for the 
year 2009 was a massive RM 1.3 billion compared to RM 841 million for the previous year. The administrative 
costs accounted for only 6.5% of its total income reflecting its prudent and efficient management. The funds 
stood at RM 17.7 billion (SOCSO Annual Report, 2009). Its impressive financial and operating success is clearly 
evident of the practical viability of its no-fault scheme. If society in the last century, and in Malaysia 43 years 
ago, had demonstrated its willingness to accept responsibility for injured workers and surrender its right to 
prosecute the alleged negligent employer, it can be said that it is very likely that a society in today’s 
contemporary era holding firm beliefs of an injured individual’s right to receive immediate care and treatment to 
alleviate financial hardship and suffering coinciding with community’s responsibility to provide such support 
and care, would readily accept an extension of the no-fault coverage to include motor vehicle accident victims.  
In considering the design of a compensation model, the hybrid or modified no-fault compensation scheme would 
be the preferred choice for the proposed scheme where both no-fault and common law benefits co-exist. Under 
such a scheme, the individual’s right to sue and recover common law damages is partially retained while at the 
same time it promises the delivery of minimum benefits to every person injured in a motor vehicle accident 
regardless of fault. It offers innocent victims the opportunity to have access to limited common law benefits thus 
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preserving the right of those who could prove fault to pursue further a tort claim in Court for damages for pain 
and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life subject, though to a statutory maximum. A qualitative verbal 
threshold will be set, designed to restrict access to tort action to the more serious injuries and unless the claimant 
meets the defined criteria for a "serious" injury, he or she is precluded from bringing an against the defendant 
driver, thus successfully eliminating all cases that involve minor injuries which are dealt with by the scheme on a 
no-fault basis. 
As a general rule, the major differences that exist in hybrid no-fault systems largely depend on the weight 
accorded to an innocent or non-negligent injured person’s right to sue for pain and suffering against the 
limitations placed on those rights by the no-fault scheme. The scheme endeavor to balance the rights of the 
innocent injured person with the need for no-fault benefits.  While a system that offers only common law 
coverage can produce unjust results, a hybrid system which guarantees no-fault entitlements is able to combine 
the best of both approaches in one system. Founded on the premise of community responsibility and care, the 
scheme focuses on the injury by providing consistent coverage and guaranteed minimum benefits to all injured 
parties regardless of fault. They provide much more predictable and coordinated care and support over an injured 
person’s lifetime while encouraging people to improve their functioning following an injury (Productivity 
Commission Report, 2011). States in Australia have recently been urged by the Finance Minister to agree on 
minimum standards for no-fault motor vehicle insurance to ensure that victims of motor vehicle accidents had 
the same level of insurance in the country’s first step towards a national no-fault injury insurance scheme (Lunn, 
2012). 
This is an affirmation of the general acceptance of the Australian people of the success of the no-fault liability 
schemes operating in Victoria and Tasmania (Wright, 2012). A prominent feature of modern compensation 
models is the provision of rehabilitation and long term care and assistance to accident victims thus resulting in a 
significant transfer of resources towards the prevention of accidents and minimization of its consequences 
through rehabilitation. A care-based scheme would be fundamentally different from a compensation model 
which is concerned with making good a loss as far as possible with money aimed at restitution. It is backward 
looking. Whereas, a care-based model, on the other hand, is concerned only with the present and the future of the 
accident victim by the provision of services and long-term attendant care aimed at maximizing recovery and 
alleviate suffering (Robinson, 1987).  
 
5. Confronting Challenges    
Although the proposed new scheme for the nation would continue with compulsory insurance, it would 
incorporate additional features to extend its coverage of guaranteed minimum benefits to all persons injured in 
motor vehicle accidents. Its inclusiveness rather than its exclusiveness would be an essential aspect of the 
philosophy of the new scheme. Its introduction would certainly draw challenges from groups who would find 
that their financial interest has been harmed. One such group that can be expected to vigorously oppose its 
introduction would be the private insurance companies who find that their role of issuing compulsory third party 
risks insurance would be undertaken by a statutory Corporation created to administer the scheme.  The 
Corporation will be entrusted with the sole issuing authority for all no-fault compulsory motor insurance policies, 
not limited to third party cover and neither would it be subject to the negligence of a driver as a pre-condition to 
statutory entitlements. 
Insurance companies have been noted to have suffered losses from third party insurance claims. In 2008, insurers 
have been reported to have collected RM 490 million in premiums for third party bodily injury and death 
coverage but paid out RM 1.3 billion in claims, resulting in a loss of RM 810 million (Ming Hin, 2010). The 
removal of this part of its general insurance business would be justified in avoiding such stressful losses and 
release resources to be absorbed by the more profitable sections of its business.  This will further allow 
insurance companies the space to explore the possibility of creating new product lines for its business to utilize 
the resources tied up in the unprofitable sectors of its business. The thought that the proposed new Act would 
provoke serious opposition from them would appear to be a misconception.  It has been further argued that they 
do not make a loss because it is for the social good but rather due to mismanagement and insufficient provision 
of reserves to meet claims (Luntz, 2004). The insurance companies would still be at liberty to continue to issue 
comprehensive motor insurance policies covering theft of vehicles, property damage to the insured’s vehicle and 
third party vehicles. Additionally, it can also experience a surge in top up coverage for personal injuries and 
death as what is guaranteed to be provided under the proposed Scheme is minimal benefits. The Scheme does not 
make good all losses suffered nor does it aim to restore the claimant to the position he had been in before the tort 
Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization                                                  www.iiste.org 





The other interest group that is likely to pose a challenge would be lawyers handling third party motor vehicle 
accident claims who would undoubtedly face a reduction in their workload. Here again, the new scheme would 
retain the common law action for damages for pain and suffering and loss of amenities. Hence, the services of 
lawyers will be required to file, prosecute and negotiate settlement of claims on behalf of injured claimants. 
Notwithstanding this, they will face a significant reduction in their incomes. But that is the very object of the 
scheme which has been designed to see a shift in the redistribution of incomes from insurance companies and 
lawyers in favour of the injured victims in the form of wider coverage and fairly generous benefits at affordable 
costs. The same money that would otherwise be fed into the tort system with all its weaknesses will be diverted 
away from insurance companies and lawyers and made available to accident victims expeditiously with a 
minimum of formalities. 
The major stakeholder of a compensation scheme is the consumers. As beneficiaries of the scheme, their views 
cannot be disregarded and must take priority when designing a scheme for their benefit. They have clearly 
expressed their dissatisfaction with the present scheme. The Consumer Association of Penang, a strong advocate 
of consumer rights had urged the Government to ignore calls made by interest groups to retain the existing 
system motivated to protect their private interest while being unconcerned to the injustices done to accident 
victims. In wasting precious time, effort and money in determining who is at fault, the Association stressed that 
the system should concentrate on assisting the injured with expeditious relief and rehabilitation while reiterating 
its firm position that the present scheme should be scrapped and be replaced by a no-fault liability system 
(Consumer Association of Penang, 2011). Being a scheme constructed to promote social justice and overall 
wellbeing of its injured citizens, individual and private interest must be compromised for the public benefit and 
greater consumer good of the nation. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Historically, the values of society based on individual culpability and responsibility was reflected in the 
traditional moral based fault regime. . With the evolution of societies, these values have changed and they have 
been replaced by beliefs that represent the contemporary twenty first century society, specifically the principles 
of community care and collective responsibility which has become a prominent feature of modern compensation 
schemes where the focus has been on the injured victim and resources directed at the injury rather than on one’s 
culpability. The time is fitting for the proposed introduction of a statutory scheme aimed at promoting social 
justice and community responsibility, care and support for victims of motor vehicle accidents. Constructed on the 
concept of no fault liability, the focus of compensation model will be directed at the injury suffered by the 
claimant and in providing a redress mechanism that will address the claimant’s concerns in an expeditious, 
inexpensive and problem-free manner without having to investigate into the blameworthiness of his conduct.  
In the final analysis, the political will and resolve of the Government is crucial for the introduction of the new 
law and to see to its successful implementation. To promote social justice, community responsibility and public 
benefit as its priority, the government must take the bold and unprecedented decision to initiate a Bill in 
Parliament that would bring about a major shift to the legal landscape when it introduces a fresh compensation 
model for victims of motor vehicle accident There are numerous challenges that the Government would confront 
throughout the implementation and operation of the Scheme, but a firm and unwavering commitment to the 
ideals of the Scheme is fundamental in realizing its goal. It is also vital for the rest of society to play a positive 
role in supporting the transformation when the nation moves away from the traditional moral based fault regime 
towards a social justice no fault scheme.   
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